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THE PURPOSES OF THE RUSSIAN-
UKRAINIAN HYBRID WAR 
 
ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to present the idea that Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war 
influences the world order and international relations. It also points to the fact that Russia 
exploits new digital technology in this conflict. Furthermore, the article emphasizes the use of 
fake news, propaganda, interference in the election processes and cybernetic attacks that are 
a new weapon of the new generation warfare – hybrid war or war of the information society. 
Moreover, the author describes the activities that Russian Federation has undertaken in 
Estonia since 2007 and it also illustrates the purpose of Russian aggressive measures. 
The author makes an attempt to prove that the main purpose of Russian-Ukrainian hybrid 
war is to create chaos, undermine the values of the democratic world and cultivate 
a comprehensive atmosphere of mistrust and nihilism. Additionally, it is stated that the 
aggressor uses the very institutes of democracy and their weaknesses as a weapon.   
KEYWORDS: war, hybrid war, Russian-Ukrainian war, fake news, propaganda, undermining 
technologies, informational operations 
 
 
CELE ROSYJSKO-UKRAIŃSKIEJ WOJNY HYBRYDOWEJ 
 
ABSTRAKT: Celem tego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie, że rosyjsko-ukraińska wojna 
hybrydowa wpływa na ład światowy i stosunki międzynarodowe. Wskazuje również na fakt, 
że Rosja wykorzystuje w tym konflikcie nowe technologie cyfrowe. Ponadto artykuł 
podkreśla wykorzystanie fake news, propagandy, zakłóceń w procesach wyborczych i ataków 
cybernetycznych, które są nową bronią w wojnie nowej generacji – wojnie hybrydowej lub 
wojnie społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Ponadto Autor opisuje działania, które w Estonii od 
2007 prowadzi Federacja Rosyjska i prezentuje środki agresywnych rosyjskich działań. Autor 
podejmuje również próbę wykazania, że głównym celem rosyjsko-ukraińskiej wojny 
hybrydowej jest stworzenie chaosu, podważenie wartości demokratycznych na świecie 
i pielęgnowanie atmosfery nieufności i nihilizmu. Ponadto stwierdza, że agresor wykorzystuje 
jako broń instytutucje demokratyche i ich słabości. 
KEYWORDS: wojna, wojna hybrydowa, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, fake news, propaganda, 
osłabienie technologii, operacje informacyjne 
                                                          
1
 Graduate student in G.S. Skovoroda Kharkiv National Pedagogical University, Department of Political Science, 
Sociology and Culturology, Ukraine. Master of laws. 
2
 Харьковский национальный педагогический университет имени Сковороды. 
N r 2 ( 3 ) / 2 0 1 7        d e s e c u r i t a t e . u p h . e d u . p l             J u l - D e c     
S t r o n a  | 190 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war has lasted for almost full four years. The achievements 
of the aggressor during this war were the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the formation of “puppet” governments in some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
that are effectively controlled by the Russian administration. In general, according to the 
preliminary findings of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, this conflict has all 
signs of international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
3
. Therefore, 
fewer reasons are left to consider this conflict as internal. We have to admit that this is 
aggression, an international crime punishable by the international community.  
However, the question arises: were these losses of the territory of Ukraine (in proportion to 
the entire territory of the state, according to the words of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko, 
is about 7%) the real purpose of Russian aggression? Definitely not. The main objective of 
Russian aggression, in the author’s opinion, is to prevent Ukraine from coming out of Russia's 
sphere of influence, to fight against Ukraine's right to its own sovereignty and against its right to 
resolve independently its own political destiny. Russia's geopolitical ambitions that are leading 
to the confrontation have been well explained by President Putin's words - he called the collapse 
of the USSR “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”. 
The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war has no analogues in world history. Indeed, 
some elements have already been used before, but the combination of all the methods, 
especially non-military, each day complements or changes the concept of the hybrid warfare. 
The main battlefronts are transferred from the real battlefields to completely different spheres: 
economics, domestic and foreign policy, international relations. Of course, history proves that 
there have already been the cases when the war became global for all spheres of the state's 
life, but the unique phenomenon of the present warfare is the fact of exploiting precisely all 
the methods and mechanisms in which ordinary citizens (non-combatants) become victims of 
an aggressor or become aggressor’s weapon themselves. 
Consequently, in this article, the author is going to consider the goals pursued by the 
aggressor and the methods by which he intends to achieve the benefits. The conclusions 
obtained in the analysis should help us to formulate the concept of effective counteraction to 
aggression in the information society in the future as well as to prepare for new challenges, 
since the methods that have been discovered could be applied not only by Russia, but also by 
terrorist organizations, radical Islamists and other actors. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 International Criminal Court. The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2016, p. 35 § 158 W https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf . 
N r 2 ( 3 ) / 2 0 1 7        d e s e c u r i t a t e . u p h . e d u . p l             J u l - D e c     
S t r o n a  | 191 
 
  
THE PURPOSES OF HYBRID WARFARE: UNDERMINING THE DEMOCRACY 
AND DISORDER 
Unfortunately, in the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, Ukraine has been given the role of 
the hot spot, the main military front and the testing ground for new instruments and methods 
of the new generation warfare. Using the concept of the "Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war”, the 
author relies on the works of national security researchers from the National Institute for 
Strategic Studies of Ukraine – one of the first to put this concept into Ukrainian scientific 
circulation
4
. 
However, the conflict itself is increasingly taking on the features of the global 
confrontation of two worlds fundamentally different in their value orientations. The sanctions 
imposed on the Russian Federation by the world's democratic community after the annexation 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the invasion on the Donbas are a common 
preventing element of deterring an aggressor that are applied by a civilized society. However, 
for Russia (in the understanding of its leaders), all the sides of the Western world, that support 
the sanctions regime against it, automatically become the party of the conflict. The West must 
understand that Russia (in its conviction) has not been fighting against only Ukraine for 
a long time. Russia fights with the whole world, where its “values” are not accepted. 
Sanctions themselves are a deferred destructive factor with catastrophic consequences 
for the Russian economy, so the Kremlin is facing the question of state’s survival and 
preserving the current model of governance along with its political elite. 
Avoiding the destructive effects of sanctions to Russia is possible in two ways: civilized 
- by withdrawing its troops from the occupied territories, conducting investigations of the 
relevant war crimes and covering the damages inflicted in Ukraine. However, the analysis of 
recent events confirms that the second, Soviet way of the Cold War was actually chosen to 
solve the problem of breaking the democratic systems in the West, weakening Western states 
from the inside, creating a so-called “controlled chaos” to achieve complete destabilization of 
political processes. Under such conditions, Russia hopes to start bargaining for the abolition 
of sanctions and simultaneously tries to maintain its “assets”. 
Hybrid war is a war of the information society, a new generation of wars, when the 
territory does not need to be physically captured, but it is necessary to gain control over people's 
minds, thoughts and decision-making
5
. Propaganda, information and cybernetic attacks, 
the creation of alternative reality in the information environment – there are the asymmetric 
actions of Russia intended to change the worldview of people in democratic states. 
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When Ukraine is forced to “physically” restrain Russia's aggression by using its armed 
forces, the West is increasingly forced to face a new type of intervention - information 
operations. Therefore, under information operations, the author means the intervention of 
state or non-state actors in the state's internal policy in order to spread aggressor’s beneficial 
informative narratives using the propaganda, disinformation or information chaos. 
Unfortunately, digitalization of modern social processes and interactions is very suitable 
environment for such undermining information operations. Digital globalization blurs the 
physical boundaries between states, in fact, violating the very sovereignty of the state. And if 
several decades ago such globalization has been seen exclusively as an element of global 
progress for simplifying communication between people, spreading knowledge, creating new 
markets and a new sector of the economy – today these technologies turned into the weapon. 
Today we are witnesses of Russia’s inferiority complex of imperial past, where Russia 
is mistakenly seeking the possibility to regain the status of a superpower not by creating 
a competitive economy, innovations, capable trade, etc., but through aggressive actions, as the 
USSR once did. The use of subversive technologies during the Cold War was a commonplace 
phenomenon for the parties 50 years ago. The combination of such subversive measures, 
including dissemination of deceptive information, using the agents of influence and covert 
organizations, media manipulations are well described in the analytical report “Active 
measures” of the USSR against USA: preface to hybrid war” of the National Institute of 
Strategic researches of Ukraine
6
. However, the West was unprepared for the fact that after the 
collapse of the USSR, modern Russia decided to use the same measures only with the use of 
modern technologies. 
In general, the Russian authorities firstly tried these technologies on their own society. 
Monopolizing the power over the media, they built another alternative reality for their citizens, 
where the West again became the main enemy to Russia. By spreading state control over social 
networks (VKontakte, Odnoklassniki), Russia began to apply its first fake accounts to form “true” 
political thoughts among citizens. The monopolized information allowed them to get rid of any 
political rivals and to neutralize the opposition's attempts to spread its point of view. Such 
processes, the sources and development of Russian digital propaganda are well described in the 
monograph by S. Sanovich from New York University
7
. 
Having formed a stable undemocratic system within the state, Russia has dared to use 
digital technologies outside the country. Therefore, in 2007, Russia used a massive hacking 
attack on the government networks of Estonia
8
. All this happened on the background of the 
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scandal with the transfer of the monument of a Soviet soldier, who is considered to be 
a symbol of Soviet occupation in Estonia. Furthermore, such measures were used during the 
Russian invasion in Georgia in 2008. Aggression against Ukraine was also prepared with the 
use of information operations. It is not surprising that Russia used information attacks before 
the annexation of the Crimea, but this issue is only beginning to become publicized in the 
West
9
. Thus, using a network of its propaganda channels such as RT or Sputnik, Russia tried 
to spread false opinions about the “internal” conflict in Ukraine, to show the Western public 
that Russia is a friendly and kind country, and the annexation of another state’s territory is not 
a crime. It should be noted that the issue of Ukraine, the use of hacker attacks by Russia, 
information operations, other subversive activities are only being analyzed and studied. This 
is a separate topic of another big research. 
Due to the fact that the Russian aggression against Ukraine did not become a blitzkrieg, 
and sanctions slowly strike the state's economy, Russia began to resort to more active actions 
and as a result the governments of the Western powers and the political systems have already 
become the target. 
Intervention in the presidential elections in the United States was accompanied not only 
by the direct actions of the Russians. As the latest investigation by Facebook shows, for two 
years from accounts “allegedly guided by Russia”, they bought a political advertisement 
worth 100 thousand dollars. An internal investigation found that 3000 advertisements and 
posts were paid from 470 accounts and pages that were not used by real people. 
The advertising, estimated to be seen from 23 to 70 million people, was not intended to 
support a particular candidate in the US presidential election
10
. In total, over the past two 
years 126 million people have seen Russian political advertising
11
. The content of the posts 
presented controversial social and political messages and affected topics such as LGBT, 
interracial relations, migration, and the firearms license. The Facebook administration is 
concerned that the social network has become an element of political confrontation. 
Conducting the investigation, they are simultaneously looking for ways to counter 
information operations. The analytical report “Information Operations and Facebook” lists the 
three main elements that the administration focused on
12
: 
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 Targeted data collection, with the goal of stealing, and often exposing, non-public 
information that can provide unique opportunities for controlling public discourse. 
 Content creation, false or real, either directly by the information operator or by seeding 
stories to journalists and other third parties, including via fake online personas. 
 False amplification, which is defined as coordinated activity by inauthentic accounts 
with the intent of manipulating political discussion (e.g., by discouraging specific 
parties from participating in discussion or amplifying sensational voices over others). 
Facebook administration detected this activity by analyzing the inauthenticity of the 
account and its behaviors, and not the content the accounts are publishing. 
Today, Facebook is trying to improve its network in order to prevent the above risks by
13
: 
 Continually studying and monitoring the efforts of those who try to negatively 
manipulate civic discourse on Facebook; 
 Innovating in the areas of account access and account integrity, including identifying 
fake accounts and expanding security and privacy settings and options; 
 Participating in multi-stakeholder efforts to notify and educate at-risk people of the 
ways they can best keep their information safe; 
 Supporting civil society programs around media literacy. 
A separate example of Russia's use of bots affecting the political preferences of citizens 
of other states is Twitter. Account @TEN_GOP was a heavyweight voice on the American far 
right. It had over 130,000 followers; it was retweeted by some of Trump’s aides. When it was 
suspended, in July 2017, voices across the American far right protested. To some observers, it 
seemed too good to be true; in October, they were proven right. Twitter confirmed that 
@TEN_GOP was a fake, run by a Russian operative connected to the notorious “troll factory” 
in St. Petersburg
14
.  
All data mentioned above is an example of using new means to destabilize the political 
system in order to undermine citizens' confidence in political processes, any sources of 
information, etc. There are strong suspicions that similar attempts to interfere in the electoral 
process were also carried out against France in the presidential elections of 2017
15
, and during 
so-called Brexit case. Planned information operations use the game on the same sensitive 
issues (migrants in the EU, Brexit
16
, world terrorism, Islam, LGBT rights, etc.), form a single 
picture of chaos, which is intended to weaken democracy, undermine the faith of people in its 
values.  
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As for Ukraine, today many finances are spent on Russia's physical deterrence and 
support of the army. That is why the information sphere remains extremely vulnerable. So, in 
the political life, in the media, in social networks in Ukraine there are actors who actively 
promote the new Russian paradigm, which reads: "The enemy is not in the Kremlin, the 
enemy is in Kiev." These actors use sensitive and painful topics to create a boiling point 
inside the state for polarizing society, so that people do not trust public institutions. For such 
manipulations, any good reason is used - from the analogue of the Russian action “immortal 
regiment” (“Bessmertnyi polk”) on the Victory Day over Nazism in the Second World War, 
to the use of manipulations on the language issue in educational reform, the question of paid 
medicine in medical reform, etc. Efforts are being made to use the Ukrainian opposition as an 
“icebreaker” of Ukrainian statehood as such. Not so long ago, the Prosecutor General of 
Ukraine provided materials on the possibility of financing the “protest actions” in Kiev by the 
Ukrainian fugitive oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko, who is hiding in Russia (where he has the 
support of the authorities) and is accused of treason in Ukraine
17
.   
It is hard to confront all these spectrum of measures taking into account the fact that 
until the end of the Russia's aggression, in Ukraine Russian television channels are 
persistently broadcasting, creating in fact their own anti-Ukrainian paradigm. Sociocultural 
convergence got worse year by year trying to absorb Ukrainian citizens. That is why when the 
aggression was carried, the aggressor was not identified as an enemy by the great masses of 
Ukrainians. The separate issue is an attempt to undermine trust to Ukraine among its partners 
and neighbours. Separate impairment of Ukraine – Poland relationships on the basis of 
historical memory is the favorable environment for Russia, where Russia predictably will be 
trying to break up partners and allies. Thus, Polish media themselves published information 
on the possibility of Russian sponsorship of the groups worsening the relations of the two 
states by their activities
18
.  
That is why the specialists of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in their analyses 
“Inside the Kremlin House of Mirrors: how liberal democracies can counter Russian 
disinformation and societal interference” provide the necessary list of measures to restrain 
informational aggression and propaganda of Russia
19
. Among the measures these need to be 
highlighted: 
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1. to invest in social media literacy for the population and for specific segments (civil 
servants, military people, journalists, bloggers); 
2. not to be afraid to close Russian television channels at a favorable opportunity, when 
they explicitly distribute fake news or propaganda threatening the public; 
3. not to repeat Russian narratives and propaganda, use own positive narratives for the 
population, apply counter-propaganda; 
4. not to allow Russia to use the structural problems of society - the government should 
address these problems; 
5. to identify those politicians, representatives of civic organizations, etc., who have 
permanent contacts with Russia; 
6. to spend money on the development of big data analyses to identify those groups that 
are most vulnerable to Russian disinformation; 
7. to understand that Russia is waging a political, non-kinetic war against a civilized world. 
Therefore, the author must admit that counteraction to destructive subversive measures 
is still taking place. While the US is investigating Russia's interference in the elections, the 
EU already has taken measures thus consolidating the strategy of counteracting the 
information threat from Russia. European parliament resolution issued in November 2016 
states that “the Russian Government is employing a wide range of tools and instruments, 
such as think tanks and special foundations (e.g. Russkiy Mir), special authorities 
(Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (such as RT), pseudo news agencies and 
multimedia services (e.g. Sputnik), cross-border social and religious groups (...) social media 
and internet trolls to challenge democratic values, divide Europe, gather domestic support and 
create the perception of failed states in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood”20, 
 
SUMMARY 
Thus, the goal of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war  can be formulated, which is to 
create chaos, undermine the values of the democratic world and cultivate a comprehensive 
atmosphere of mistrust and nihilism. This goal extends not only to Ukraine but also to those 
states that support it. Russia has transformed democracy (which Russia itself does not know) 
into our enemy. Using the basic values of democracy as a weapon, the aggressor has made it 
possible for freedom of speech to become a right to lie, freedom to receive information – to 
freedom to spread fake, lies and propaganda, freedom to peaceful gatherings – to the right to 
street collisions, and social networks - to a chaotic collection of non-existent individuals to 
incite hostility. The very idea of democracy is undermined, the very possibility of free, honest 
and unbiased expression of the person is questionable. 
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That is why, by categorizing such informational operations depending on their purpose, 
we can distinguish: 1) operations on the split of a society within the state for its weakening or 
bringing their own candidates to power; 2) operations to discredit the state on the world stage 
and for the tensions with its neighbors or partners; 3) operations for the dissemination of 
general information chaos to achieve individual tactical goals by the aggressor. 
That is why one can say that in the face of an active informational confrontation, when the 
state is trying to be destroyed and captured from within, information-blasting technologies are 
aimed at the desocialisation of the individual. This person does not trust the authorities for which 
he/she voted for, does not trust the institutes of democracy, does not trust the media, and does not 
trust the neighbours. Losing their own values, such a person begins to trust fakes and other 
people's propaganda. A person pulled out of a normal society, who has lost any value pointers, 
without his/her own wish becomes the weapon of the enemy. Therefore, right and balanced 
informational policy should be held, information security, information literacy must be carried on, 
and it is vital to react timely to new subversive technologies and information traps. 
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